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Abstract:  Ambivalence – where we experience two conflicting emotional  responses to the same object,
person or state of affairs – is sometimes  thought to pose a problem for cognitive theories of emotion.
Drawing on the ideas of the Stoic Chrysippus, I argue that   a cognitivist  can account for ambivalence
without retreating from the view that emotions involve fully-fledged evaluative judgments.  It  is central to
the  account I offer that emotions involve two kinds of judgment: one about the object of emotion, and one
about the subject's response.
I: Examples And A Thesis
Consider three instances of ambivalence.
Rival:  Patricia  hopes  to  become  Chair  of  her  department.  She  enjoys  a  friendly  professional  
rivalry with a colleague, Ian. On hearing that Ian has been preferred for the post of Chair, she  
experiences simultaneous disappointment and happiness. (Greenspan 1980)
Cid:  Ximene  is  deeply  in  love  with  Rodrigo  until  he  accidentally  kills  her  father.  
Subsequently  Ximene  comes  to  hate  and  resent  Rodrigo,  while  remaining  in  love  with  him.   
(Carr 2009)
Beckert:  On  watching  Fritz  Lang's  film  M James  is  simultaneously  moved  by  disgust  for  its  
protagonist, the child-murderer Beckert, and sympathy for his plight as he becomes the target of a 
gang of criminals who try him in a kangaroo court. (Harold 2010)
In each scenario an individual experiences conflicting emotions. However, we may well think that
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Patricia, Ximene and James need not be rationally deficient in any way.  A plausible account of emotion
needs to explain how such situations are possible.1 It should also account for our intuition that none of these
individuals need be guilty of irrationality, either by vindicating it, or  explaining it away. 
Ambivalence is often thought to present a problem for cognitivist accounts of emotion.2 How deep
the problem runs is controversial. Clarity is not enhanced by disagreements as to exactly which accounts
count as cognitivist. I shall apply the label  broadly. Paradigmatic instances of cognitivism will be views on
which  emotions  are  constituted either  wholly or  partly  by judgments;  but  I  shall  take  views  on  which
emotions are wholly or partly constituted by states which are less committal than all-out judgments,  such as
thoughts, or by intentional states which have a distinct functional role from judgments, such as perceptual
states,  to count  as cognitivist.  I  shall  take accounts on which specifying the propositional  content of an
emotion plays a significant role in specifying which emotion we are talking about to count as members of the
broad family, unless there are significant considerations against doing so.  
 Contemporary  cognitivist accounts of emotions cannot account adequately for the phenomenon of
ambivalence. Such accounts need either to explain why ambivalence can be a rational response to a situation,
or to explain why it can often seem so. They should also account for certain aspects of the phenomenology of
ambivalence. Cognitivists who attempt to account for ambivalence have typically concentrated on the first of
these tasks and neglected the second. 
However, cognitivists should not lose heart. One version of cognitivism enables us to retain the core
1 Pugmire 1996, 2005 argues that cases of what he calls 'whole-hearted' ambivalence are not possible. 
Perhaps  he would regard not  Rival and Cid as involving ambivalence of this sort. But they seem to be 
genuine possibilities which an adequate account of emotions needs to account for. (For Pugmire's view of 
cases like Beckert, see footnote 8.)    
2  Greenspan 1980  appeals to ambivalence to argue against the view that emotions are a kind of judgment. 
Morton 2002 and Tappolet 2005 suggest the problem affects other kinds of cognitivist.
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cognitivist commitment to the idea that emotions have propositional content, and allows us to do justice both
to the potential rationality of ambivalent responses, and to their phenomenology. It is based on views of the
Stoic Chrysippus, as presented to us in Cicero's  Tusculan Disputations,  and canonically reconstructed by
Richard Sorabji (Sorabji 2000). A distinctive feature of Chrysippus's view, as Sorabji presents it, is that he
takes emotions to involve two different kinds of judgment: one about evaluative features of our situation, and
the other about our bodily response to that situation. By appealing to these two different kinds of judgment,
we can account both for the apparent rationality of at least some instances of ambivalence, and for their
distinctive phenomenology.
 This paper is not intended primarily as a work of historical exegesis. I shall make few – perhaps no -
original  exegetical  suggestions.  Furthermore,  the  aspects  of  Chrysippus's  view which  I  recommend  are
independent of, and require no commitment to, other aspects of his position which have little to recommend
them, such as his view that the majority of everyday human emotional responses are irrational.3 Indeed, in
claiming that some instances of ambivalence are, or can seem rational, I commit myself to a position which
Chrysippus and other Stoics would have rejected. I am arguing that Chrysippus's account was better than he
could have recognized: it accounts for phenomena which his broader philosophical commitments would have
prevented him from acknowledging.            
II: Cognitivism and  Rational Ambivalence
 Within  the  cognitivist  framework,  ambivalence  is  most  naturally  understood  as  involving  a
commitment to judgments with incompatible contents. Thus, we might see Patricia, who is simultaneously
happy and disappointed, as judging both that that is terrible that Ian has been promoted, and that it is good
that  he  has  been;  Ximene  as  believing  both  that  Rodrigo  is  malign  and  destructive,  and  that  he  is  a
3 In attempting to separate Stoic accounts of emotions from specifically Stoic claims about value I follow 
the precedent of Nussbaum 2002. But I take her account of Stoic theories of emotion to be inferior to 
Sorabji's.
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fundamental source of good in her life; and James as believing that Beckert both deserves and does not
deserve his fate. Since an individual cannot be committed to incompatible judgments without being irrational
accounts of this sort cannot allow for cases where ambivalence appears rational. 
Should we allow for them? Greenspan (1980) has argued, prominently, that we should. As she points
out, 'irrational' is typically a term of reproach. And yet, Greenspan emphasizes, there might be nothing wrong
with the combination of attitudes manifested in Rivals. But if there is nothing wrong with this combination of
attitudes, then they seem to be exempt from criticism, and a fortiori  exempt from criticism on grounds of
irrationality. 
This argument relies on the idea that there is nothing wrong with the emotions involved in Rivals.
One might go further, and suggest that in each of the cases discussed in Section I an ambivalent response is
superior to one that avoids ambivalence. For we might think that a response that avoids ambivalence fails to
give  due  acknowledgment  to  the  values  at  stake  in  the  two conflicting  responses.  If  Patricia  were  not
ambivalent, she would fail to give due acknowledgment either to her own claims or those of her rival; if
Ximene were not ambivalent, she would fail to acknowledge both the value that Rodrigo has in her life and
the  loss  she  has  experienced  through  the  death  of  her  father;  if  James  were  not  both  disgusted  and
sympathetic he would be failing to acknowledge either the awfulness of Beckert's crimes, or the fact that
despite those crimes he is being treated wrongly.       
Someone  might  hold  that  Patricia,  Ximene  and James  are  rightly exempted  from criticism,  but
nevertheless  irrational.  They might  suggest  that  in  assessing  the  rationality  of  a  set  of  attitudes  and in
addressing whether they were the best set of attitudes to have overall one was involved in two separate kinds
of evaluation by reference to two different  kinds of standard.  Or they might  suggest  that  the responses
exemplified in a case like  Rivals were only ideal when considered as examples of the kinds of responses
which real-life human beings could be expected to have. 
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These points seem like good counters to the first  line of argument;  but they do not address the
second.  If  ambivalent  responses  are  better  than  non-ambivalent  responses  in  the  scenarios  we  have
considered, then in judging them to be immune from criticism, we are not simply saying that they are the
best responses we can manage given understandable human limitations, but the most adequate response to
the situations involved.4     
Cognitivists have responded to this problem in two different ways. A cognitivist might retreat from
the claim that emotions involve judgments to the idea that they involve some kind of cognitive state of a kind
K  which  has  the  following  property:  a  subject  can  be  in  a  K-state  with  respect  to  two  incompatible
propositions without thereby being guilty of irrationality. Eligible K-states include thoughts (Stocker, 1987);
taking  pleasure  or  pain  in  a  given  thought  (Greenspan,  1988);  half-hearted  beliefs  (Harold,  2010);  or
perceptual states (de Sousa 1987). 
Alternatively,  or additionally,  the cognitivist may construe the contents of the propositional state
involved in ambivalent emotions in such a way as to ensure that they do not conflict. This may involve
claiming that the emotion-constituting states are directed at different objects, different aspects of the same
object, or compatible, yet contrasting, properties of the same object (Tappolet 2005). Thus Patricia might
judge that it is bad that the department will not flourish under her stewardship, while judging it good that Ian
has been rewarded for his hard work; Ximene may believe that Rodrigo is a source of good in her life but
also a danger to those around her; and James that Beckert deserves some form of punishment, but not the
vigilante justice he actually receives. 
Accounts of either sort can explain why ambivalence need not involve irrationality. However, as I
shall now argue, they cannot provide us with a convincing account of the phenomenology of ambivalence. 
III: The Phenomenology of Ambivalence
4 Luke Brunning raised this issue. 
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Ambivalence typically seems to involve some kind of experience of conflict. Our awareness of the
tension involved in ambivalence is felt as part of the emotions involved, rather than something of which we
have have a detached and independent awareness. Consider two ways of developing the case of Cid. In one
case, Ximene alternates between episodes in which she experiences a burning hatred for Rodrigo and ones in
which she is overwhelmed by love for him. In the second case both the love and the hatred she experiences
are present in her mind at the same time, along with the discomfort that the compresence of these emotions
involves.5  Although both versions of the scenario will involve the same kind of conflicting K-states, only the
second involves the kind of ambivalence which is a challenge to the cognitivist. 
The second way of developing Cid seems to involve a felt element, over and above the alternating
experiences of hate and love in the first  case, which the first  scenario does not.  Charcaterizing this felt
element  accurately is tricky. It need not involve a sense of discomfort. Consider Beckert. Harold 2010 points
out that in appreciating  M we may take pleasure in film-maker's ability to present us with a scenario that
shows us just how 'messy' the world is, when compared to the  simplistic categories that our initial moral
judgments incline us towards.6 Discomfort need not be involved. Perhaps emotional responses to fiction are a
marginal  case.7 If  so,  we  should  not  rely  on  them  in  trying  to  characterize  the  phenomenology  of
ambivalence. 
 However,  Greenspan 1980 suggests  that  cases  like Rival  also show that  ambivalence need not
involve discomfort. She also notes that we do not always seek to resolve the conflict or tension which is
5 We can also imagine cases without discomfort. They are not interesting in this context.
6 Indeed Walton 1978 denies  that the emotion-like states that works of fiction arouse in us are genuine states
of emotion. If so, then Beckert does not provide us with a genuine case of emotional ambivalence.
7 Pugmire 1996 suggests this is true because of the kind of detachment characteristic of aesthetic 
appreciation, although he also suggests other kinds of ambivalence may involve related forms of 
detachment. 
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characteristic of ambivalence, emphasizing that in a situation like Rival, emotional maturity may involve a
recognition of the incompatibility of two good states of affairs, and suggesting that one might regard this as
something which constitutes part of the richness of life rather than something to be lamented. However,
while a mature aesthetic or moral sensibility may involve an appreciation of emotional states characteristic of
scenarios like Rival  and Beckert,  it is hard to characterize the kind of excellence of sensibility involved in
this appreciation, without describing it as involving a distinctive response to a kind  of conflict. Indeed it is
natural to see ambivalence as involving not simply a conflict between attitudes, but some kind of experience
of conflict. One's experience is that of being in a state which calls for  some kind of resolution. 
One metaphor which suggests itself in this context is that of an unresolved discord in a piece of
music, which calls for a resolution which it may or may not receive. Notice that tensions of this sort need not
be unpleasurable. Part of the skill of the composer lies in using them to beautiful effect. Nevertheless they
can only do so by exploiting the fact that the chord itself seems to demand some kind of resolution.    
A good account of the emotions should enable us to explain the phenomenology of ambivalence.  A
cognitivist might point to the fact that the emotions involved have contrary contents. However, in explaining
why ambivalence need not be irrational, the accounts we have considered seem to have deprived us of the
resources  needed  to  explain  the  sense  in  which  ambivalence  involves  conflict. If  ambivalent  emotions
involve having thoughts, beliefs or judgments which are not incompatible with one another, it is unclear why
ambivalence  should  present  itself  to  us  as  something  which  needs  to  be  resolved. 8 And  if  ambivalent
emotions involve K-states of a sort that do not preclude a rational individual from holding K to both of the
propositions p and not p, it is unclear why there should be any tension involved here. 
IV: Historical Disclaimers
I  shall  now  argue  that  Chrysippus's  account  of  emotions  provides  us  with  the  materials  for
8 This counts against Tappolet's 2005 proposal in particular.
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constructing a more satisfactory account of the phenomenon of ambivalence than contemporary cognitivist
views do. The view I shall put forward will involve a commitment to Stoic views about the kinds of states
emotions are, and to a distinctively Stoic view about the kinds of judgment that emotions involve.9 However,
it will not involve any commitment to another distinctively Stoic view about the  emotions – namely that
they typically involve false beliefs – and in particular, false beliefs about  the good.10 
Ambivalence  would  probably  not  have  seen  particularly  salient,  or  particularly  interesting
phenomenon to historical exponents of Stoicism. The Stoics were interested in one kind of phenomenon
which we might characterize as a form of emotional conflict, namely conflicts between reason and emotion.
Accounting for the possibility of conflicts of this sort seems to have been central to Chrysippus's discussion
of Euripides' Medea.11 The kinds of conflict I have been dealing with here are rather different:  conflicts
between two different emotions. 
The Stoic commitment to the idea that emotions typically involve false beliefs may explain why
Stoics do not  discuss conflicts  between different  emotions.  On a Stoic view, such conflicts  would have
involved conflicts between several false beliefs. Conflicts between such beliefs, and any discomfort to which
they might give raise, are unlikely to have seemed surprising to Stoics. The idea that false beliefs can conflict
9 My account of Chrysippus's view, and of its distinctive 'two judgments' feature relies heavily on Sorabji
2000.
10 The restriction to what is typical here will  matter to historians. On the standard Stoic view, only the
emotions of the ordinary person involve false beliefs about the good. Things will be different where the Stoic
sage is concerned. But the restriction makes little difference here: Stoic sages are rare, and the characters
whose predicaments we have been considering are unlikely candidates for sage-hood.
11 See Gill 1983 and, for a useful overview of subsequent discussion Graver 2007 pp71 ff. Our evidence for 
Chrysippus's interest in this issue comes from Galen's reports of his views in the Principles of 
Hippocrates and Plato. See also Tielemann 1996, 2003 for attempts at a comprehensive reconstruction of
Chrysippus's account.
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with one another is scarcely puzzling. Similarly,  no Stoic would have been committed to the project of
explaining the rational acceptability, or apparent rational acceptability of ambivalent emotions. Finally, the
kind of discomfort or tension involved in ambivalence is unlikely to have seemed especially interesting to
someone who thinks, as the Stoics did, that any false beliefs about matters of value are likely to lead to
mental disturbance.
 It is therefore surprising and significant that Chrysippus's view provides us with the resources to
construct an account of ambivalence which is  superior to the modern cognitivist  accounts which I  have
discussed in Section II.  For, as I shall now argue, it does precisely this. 
V: How Chrysippean Cognitivism Solves the Problems
For Chrysippus, emotions involve two kinds of judgment. One concerns the external world: typically
it will  have as its content that something good or bad is present.  (Call  this  an E-judgment.) The second
judgment has as its object a response to  the object of the first judgment. (Call this an R-judgment.) Typically
Chrysippus talks of 'expansion and 'contraction' in the R-judgments. 
 Chrysippus's  account does not  make  much room for individual  objects,  or  particular  aspects of
objects to be the intentional objects of emotions. However, it can easily be amended to allow for this. It can
also be adapted to cover a wider range of emotions than the four typically recognized by the Stoics. We
could either allow a wider range of evaluative propositions to figure in emotions than the Stoics do, or
characterize the physiological responses involved in the R-judgments more finely than they do. We also need
not accept the Stoic view that the E-judgments involved in the majority of human emotions are false. The
amended  view  is  still  distinctive:  it  differs  from  contemporary  forms  of  cognitivism  insofar  as  it  is
committed to the idea that emotions involve a pair of judgments and insofar as the content of one of those
judgments refers to the appropriateness of a response.
9
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What are expansion and contraction? Presumably, they involve some kind of physical response to the
object or situation exciting the emotion. But this under-determines matters. We might take expansion and
contraction to be involuntary physiological reflexes.12 Since Chrysippus does not hold that expansions and
contractions themselves are constitutive of emotions, but only that R-judgments about them are, his view is
compatible  with the  existence of  (token)  emotions that  are  not  expressed bodily. 13 Nevertheless  on this
interpretation  the  view  may  require  that  there  are  physiological  responses  which  are  characteristic  of
particular  emotion-types.  It  also  requires  us  to  be  able  to  make  judgments  about  these  physiological
responses.  This  seems implausible:  even if  there  are  involuntary physiological  changes characteristic  of
different emotions, we often lack the concepts necessary to make judgments about them.
Alternatively we might take see expansions and contractions to be voluntary actions motivated by
the presence or absence of some good. Since backward-looking emotions such as sadness need not motivate
any kind of  voluntary action this  leaves  us  with an implausible  account  of  emotion. 14 However  a  third
possibility seems more promising. This is to take 'expansion' and 'contraction' to be generic names for ways
in which emotions can be expressed in action as we do when we weep out of grief or cheer out of joy. These
forms of expression stand at a range of different points on a continuum between fully voluntary actions
aimed at satisfying some goal of the agent and involuntary physiological reflexes (Hursthouse 1991). There
seem  to  be  characteristic  forms  of  expression  associated  with  many  emotions.  Furthermore,  unlike
involuntary reflexes these forms of expression in action seem to be the kinds of thing that we can recognize
and  can and do judge to be appropriate (or inappropriate) to a situation.     
On the amended Stoic view, we might  see Patricia's  disappointment   in  Rivals  as involving the
following judgments: 
12 This seems to be Sorabji's view. 
13 Could there be emotion  types that have no characteristic bodily expression? Perhaps. On my account,
emotions of this sort will not give rise to the phenomenology characteristic of ambivalence. 
14 As one referee noted.
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DE: The evil of my not being head of department is present.
DR: Contraction is appropriate.
One the same view her happiness involves the following  judgments:  
PE: The good of my colleague's being head of department is present.  
     PR: Expansion is appropriate.
 If we focus only on the judgments PE and DE, we will not see Patricia as irrational, since PE and
DE can both be true. However matters seem more complicated once we consider the judgments PR and DR. 
If PR and DR are 'all-out' judgments, they seem incompatible with one another. If so ambivalence
will involve a kind of irrationality.15 Still this view explains why we do not typically take ambivalence to
involve  irrationality.  When  assessing  whether  an  ambivalent  individual  is  irrational,  we  overlook  the
possibility of beliefs such as PR and DR. Once our attention is drawn to them, we can see that ambivalence
does involve a kind of irrationality.
Still, there is more to say. The terms 'expansion' and 'contraction' seem like labels for states which
exclude one another on logical grounds. However, I suggested that we should interpret Chrysippus' account
as making reference to paradigmatic expressive responses such as cheering and weeping. Logic does not rule
out the possibility of someone simultaneously weeping and cheering. However, perhaps something else does:
namely human physiology. If contraction and expansion are understood as involving fully voluntary actions,
this might seem implausible: it's natural to thiuk we have a range of responses at our disposal, which need
15 It will, however, be a kind of irrationality which, on the Stoic view, it is feasible to avoid: as Sorabji
documents in detail, much Stoic writing on the emotions takes as its theme the way in which we can avoid
unwanted emotions by getting rid of R-judgments.
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not all be incompatible with one another. But if we see these forms of expression as standing somewhere
between voluntary actions and reflexes, physiology can play a role in explaining the incompatibility.16  
This view accounts for almost all of the phenomena. But we might instead take PR and DR to be
provisional judgments. Represent their contents as follows: 
PRP: Insofar as some good is present, expansion is appropriate.
DRP: Insofar as some evil is present, contraction is appropriate.     
Now Patricia is committed to holding that 
PE: The good of my colleague's being head of department is present.
DE: The evil of my not being head of department is present.
PRP: Insofar as some good is present, expansion is appropriate.
DRP: Insofar as some evil is present, contraction is appropriate.     
 Since  these  beliefs  are  consistent  with  one  another,  Patricia's  emotional  state  need  involve  no
irrationality.  This  is  as  it  should  be.  Furthermore,  this  view  provides  a  natural  explanation  of  the
phenomenology of ambivalence. Although PRP and DRP are mutually consistent, there is a tension between
them. We might see judgments like these as seeking resolution in the form of an all-out judgment of the
appropriateness  of  either  contraction  or  expansion,  and  of  the  occurrence  of  the  relevant  expressive
16  Ambivalent  states involving different pairs of emotions would presumably involve different pairs of
incompatible  physical  responses.  One  might  wonder  –  as  one  referee  did  –  whether  everything  we
typically count as a positive emotion involves a response incompatible with some response to a negative
emotion? I find it plausible that something of this sort underlies our folk classifications of emotions as
positive and negative.  
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responses. When both responses cannot occur, together, we have an unresolved conflict. Hence the tension
we take to be characteristic of ambivalence: a tension we can expect to be reflected in our experience to the
extent that the judgments which give rise to it may also be; and which depending on our character, we may
either find uncomfortable or enjoy. So this account may be better than the last.
 How essential to this account are the distinctively Chrysippean judgments about the appropriateness
of contraction and expansion? Might it be enough to see emotions as consisting of  prima facie judgments
with contents such as DE and PE, and the tension which is part of ambivalence to be something which arises
out of a need to resolve these two judgments into some kind of overall judgment of the goodness or badness
of my situation as a whole?17 I think not: there is no reason to see all-out judgments of the form DE and PE
as conflicting. It is equally unclear why  failure to resolve prima facie judgments with these contents should
generate any kind of discomfort. There seems nothing obviously troubling about an all-out judgment to the
effect that my situation is in some respects good and in some respects bad. So the distinctively Chrysippean
judgments are indeed essential here. 18
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